

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 March 1983

Mr. Brian V. Kinney  
Chief, Declassification and  
Historical Research Branch  
Records Management Division  
Washington Headquarters Services  
Room 1D517, Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Kinney:

Mr. E. E. Lowry's memorandum of 1 March 1983 forwarded three documents with the request that we review their classification status. We have reviewed the documents and our determinations are as follows:


1. A paper entitled "Current Supplement to Indonesian Section of First Progress Report on NSC 124/2, August 5, 1953" (TOP SECRET). The CIA has no objection to the declassification of this document.

2. A letter from Allen W. Dulles to James S. Lay, Jr. forwarding a TOP SECRET memorandum concerning NSC Action No. 624 b, dated 23 April 1952. We received the letter only, without a copy of the enclosure. We have declassified only the covering letter. The enclosure will require separate classification review before it may be downgraded or released.

3. A paper entitled "Terms of Reference: Proposed Special Estimate: Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to a US Decision to Prepare the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists", dated 6 May 1952 (TOP SECRET). We have declassified this document.

The three documents are returned herewith as requested. The CIA actions have been marked on the documents.

Sincerely,

  
Chief, Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services  
Directorate of Administration

STAT

Enclosures:

1. Paper dtd 5 August 1953
2. Letter dtd 23 April 1952
3. Paper dtd 5 May 1952

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
SEPARATED FROM  
ENCLOSURES

UNCLASSIFIED

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

STAT

FROM:

DDA/OIS/CRD  
322 Ames Bldg

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

11 Mar 83

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.

2E 6104  
HQS

DDI/IRO

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

OIS/CRD  
322 Ames Bldg.

8.

9.

10.

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12.

13.

14.

15.

1. DOD request for review.  
CRD will declassify if DDI concurs.

Concur.

STAT

DDI | IRO

14 march 1983

STAT



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

13 April 1952

James G. Lays, Jr., Esq.  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lays:

Enclosed herewith is a memorandum prepared and signed by Mr. Nathan, and signed by Mr. Frank C. Nash and the undersigned, pursuant to NSC Agency No. 6144. I have given this memorandum the date of April 13, 1952, the date of the last signature. I am sending copies of this letter to Mr. Nathan and Mr. Nathan.

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles  
Deputy Director

ILLEGIB

Encl. separate  
Encl. separate  
cc: Mr. Charles E. Nathan  
Mr. Frank C. Nash

TOP SECRET

002160

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offensive operations against the Chinese Communists (considering requirements for internal security and for defense of Taiwan)?

(Review contributions to NIE-27/1)

1. Ground forces
  - a. Strength
  - b. Disposition
  - c. Combat effectiveness and morale with particular reference to amphibious operations
  - d. Manpower resources
2. Air forces
  - a. Strength
  - b. Disposition
  - c. Combat effectiveness and morale
  - d. Airlift capabilities
3. Naval forces
  - a. Strength
  - b. Disposition
  - c. Combat effectiveness and morale, with particular reference to amphibious operations
  - d. Waterlift capabilities

B. What are the factors in the political and economic situation on Taiwan that affect the capabilities of the

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Nationalist Armed Forces? How do these factors affect the armed forces?

(Review Contributions to NIE-27/1)

C. What are the deficiencies in materiel and training which limit current Chinese Nationalist capabilities to engage in the following offensive operations against the Chinese Communists:

1. Raids, feints and diversions against the coast of mainland China?
2. A more widespread and effective guerrilla campaign on the mainland?
3. Naval action?
4. Air action?
5. Employment of Nationalist troops in Korea?
6. Deployment of Nationalist troops to the defense of Southeast Asia?
7. An invasion of mainland China, without US naval and air support? With US naval and air support?
8. Hold a beachhead on the mainland once established?
9. Other types of operations?

D. To what extent can these deficiencies be overcome by the aid of an intensive US training and equipment program? How long would such a program take?

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E. What would be the Chinese Communist capabilities to counter each of the Chinese Nationalist offensive operations of paragraph C above?

1. Could significant defections to the Nationalists be expected?

VI. PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A US DECISION TO PREPARE THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

A. The Chinese Nationalists

1. The strength and stability of the Nationalist regime?
2. Chinese Nationalist diplomacy?

B. The Chinese Communists -- Probable political and military reactions to an identifiable preparation of Nationalist forces for offensive operations?

C. The USSR -- Probable political and military reactions to an identifiable preparation of Nationalist forces for offensive operations?

D. Asiatic Reactions -- Probable political reactions to identifiable Chinese Nationalist preparations for offensive operations against the Chinese Communists of:

1. India?
2. Japan?

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3. Pakistan?
4. Overseas Chinese communities?
5. Southeast Asian countries?
6. Other South Asian and Near Eastern countries?

E. Reactions of Australia and New Zealand

F. Western European Reactions

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

March 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review

During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) documents being carried out under the guidelines of Executive Order 12356, the Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned up the attached document(s).

The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise of interest to you.

It is requested that your agency review the documents and recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies.

It is requested that you provide response within 60 days so that a decision on the disposition of the documents may be made promptly. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to have referred to you in the future.

Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Headquarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon completion of your review.

Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

*E. E. Lowry Jr.*  
E. E. Lowry Jr.  
OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (3)

AL30848

OSD-DB-TS-040-83

**TOP SECRET**

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. Paper, Current Supplement to Indonesian Section of First Progress Report on NSC 124/2, Aug 5, 1953 (TS).
2. Letter, re: NSC Action 624-b, Apr 23, 1952 (TS).
3. Letter, Subj: Terms of Reference: Proposed Special Estimate: Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to a US Decision to Prepare the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, May 6, 1952 (TS).